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Green and DiMuzio: Cardozo and the Civil Jury

CARDOZO AND THE CIVIL JURY
Singularly enough, nearly all legal theory in negligence
cases is designed to serve the ends of allocating the
power of judgment respectively to judge and jury.*
Michael D. Green and Ashley DiMuzio
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper began with an invitation by Professor Sam Levine
to the senior co-author of this article to participate in the March 2017
Cardozo Symposium at Touro Law School. After the symposium, the
junior co-author joined in working remarks made at the symposium
into this article. Where we use the singular first-person pronoun, we
refer to the senior co-author, although the work reflected in this article
is a joint effort.
I readily accepted Sam’s invitation. I am a torts teacher, and
Cardozo opinions are ubiquitous in torts casebooks. I have read and
taught them for many years.1

*LEON

GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 261 (1930).
cannot say enough about the generosity, kindness, and encouragement provided by
Professor Andrew Kaufman in assisting us in this project. He has talked with us about our
ideas, made insightful suggestions about where we might find additional evidence in support
of our thesis, helped us think through the evidence that we did secure, and assisted us in
obtaining inaccessible documents that he prepared decades ago during his work on the Cardozo
biography. All to assist us in disagreeing with a position he took in his Cardozo biography.
John Goldberg carefully read a draft and made many helpful comments for which we are
grateful. We also appreciate the assistance of the Special Collections staff at the Harvard Law
Library, especially Edward Moloy and Jane Kelly in facilitating access to Kaufman’s papers
prepared during his research efforts for the Cardozo book, and Julianne Claydon, the librarian
for the New York Court of Appeals, and Jim Folts at the New York State Archives, for
facilitating access to internal Court of Appeals memoranda authored by Judge Benjamin
Cardozo.
1 This paper is limited to Cardozo and the civil jury based on our expertise and the different
considerations that might exist in one’s attitude about criminal juries and civil juries, although
we welcome a parallel inquiry into Cardozo and his approach to the criminal jury. We limit
our consideration to tort cases for reasons of expertise, time, and the fact that tort law is the
common law area in which judge-jury allocation issues arise most frequently.
We
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As I started thinking and reading about Judge Cardozo after a
bibliography was prepared, I began to appreciate what a daunting task
I had undertaken and regretted that I had accepted Sam’s kind
invitation.
There are six biographies of Cardozo,2 including Andrew
Kaufman’s definitive biography in 1998. In addition, there are five
books by Cardozo, four containing his revised academic lectures over
a decade and numerous miscellaneous speeches delivered over his
career.3 That work is supplemented by at least three Symposia devoted
to Cardozo,4 not to mention this one, over 50 memorials or assessments
of his work in the 1930s,5 countless later articles devoted to him, his
opinions, his rhetorical style, as well as his views and lectures about
jurisprudence.6 I despaired of finding something new to say about
Cardozo—a concern that I imagine my fellow participants in the Touro
symposium also shared,7 as Joel Goldstein confirmed at the
symposium, expressing a similar sentiment.8
2 ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO (Harv. Univ. Press 1998); GEORGE S. HELLMAN,
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, AMERICAN JUDGE (Whittlesley House, McGraw-Hill 1940); BERYL
H. LEVY, CARDOZO AND FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THINKING (Case West. Univ. Press rev. ed.
1969); RICHARD POLENBERG, THE WORLD OF BENJAMIN CARDOZO (Harv. U. Press 1997);
JOSEPH POLLARD, MR. JUSTICE CARDOZO: A LIBERAL MIND IN ACTION (The Yorktown Press
1935); RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION (U. Chi. Press 1990).
3 Four of the books and many of Cardozo’s other speeches are collected in SELECTED
WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO. MARGARET E. HALL, SELECTED WRITINGS OF
BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDOZO (Matthew Bender; Margaret E. Hall ed., 1967) [hereafter
“SELECTED WRITINGS”]. The fifth book, a treatise, was written while Cardozo was in practice.
See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF
NEW YORK (2d ed. 1909).
4 A major symposium, held after Cardozo’s death, was published in parallel in the Harvard
and Columbia Law Reviews and the Yale Law Journal in January 1939. SELECTED WRITINGS,
supra note 3, at 432. The initial issue of the Cardozo Law Review was devoted to articles
about Judge and Justice Cardozo and his work. 1 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (1979).
5 See SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 3, at 430-32.
6 See id.
7 The thought also occurred to former Chief Judge Judith Kaye who wrote on the Historical
Society of the New York Courts website in a short biography of Cardozo:
Anyone preparing a portrait of Benjamin Nathan Cardozo would necessarily approach
the task with great trepidation. Already there are so many wonderful writings about
him, most especially Professor Andrew Kaufman’s 731-page masterpiece, which took
more than 41 years to complete. Surely, by now everything worth saying (and perhaps
some that is not) about Cardozo has been said.
Judith S. Kaye, Benjamin Nathan Cardozo, HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF NEW YORK COURTS,
available at http://www.nycourts.gov/history/legal-history-new-york/luminaries- courtappeals/cardozo-benjamin-feature.html
8 Symposium, Benjamin N. Cardozo - Cardozo and Judicial Decision Making, THE JEWISH
LAW INSTITUTE AT TOURO COLLEGE JACOB D. FUCHSBERG LAW CENTER (March 23-24, 2017)
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But as I read more, I realized that each of our predecessors who
addressed Cardozo were influenced by their own vision, values, biases,
and interests. And what I have to say today is similarly a product of
the “total push and pressure of the cosmos”9—as William James put
it—that I have experienced.
As a torts teacher, I fervently believe that to understand U.S.
tort law, one must understand the respective role of judge and jury. I
spend a lot of time impressing that view on my students and, before
the Civil Procedure teachers get their hooks into them with summary
judgment, judgment as a matter of law, the respective roles of judge
and jury on matters of fact, law, and mixed questions of fact and law,
and sufficiency of the evidence, I make them attend to those matters as
they read torts cases.
I also believe that our tort law is significantly shaped by the fact
that we have a jury deciding the vast majority of tort cases.10 By
contrast, in virtually no other western country is a civil jury employed
regularly,11 although vestiges still exist in Canada and Great Britain.
To take a concrete example, “duty,” actually “no-duty,” is
frequently invoked by judges as a way to avoid leaving the outcome to
the jury when they think that liability in that case should not be
imposed.12 By contrast, in other continental legal systems, there is
virtually no invocation of duty as there is no jury to control.13
https://videos.tourolaw.edu/media/Benjamin+N.+Cardozo+Cardozo+and+Judicial+Decision
making/0_yqt7qth8/68043701.
9 WILLIAM JAMES, The Present Dilemma in Philosophy, Lecture I, in PRAGMATISM: A NEW
NAME FOR SOME OLD WAYS OF THINKING (Longman Green and Co. 1907).
10 Michael D. Green, The Impact of the Jury on American Tort Law, in EUROPEAN TORT LAW
(2005) (Helmut Koziol & Barbara C. Steininger eds. 2006).
11 See, e.g., JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN ET AL., THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: EUROPE, LATIN
AMERICA, AND EAST ASIA 1014 (1994) (stating that in common law countries other than the
United States, “the civil jury has been abolished”); NEIL VIDMAR, A HISTORICAL AND
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON THE COMMON LAW JURY, in WORLD JURY SYSTEMS 1, 3 (Neil
Vidmar ed., 2000) (“[W]ith the exception of the United States and parts of Canada, the jury
has been largely abandoned for civil cases. . . .”); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS:
CHALLENGE AND REFORM 193–94 n.1 (1996) (commenting that the abolition of the civil jury
is “a course that the rest of the civilized world took long ago”).
12 See, e.g., Posecai v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 752 So. 2d 762 (La. 1999); Packard v. Darveau,
759 F.3d 897 (8th Cir. 2014). The New York Court of Appeals has been particularly practiced
at this technique over the years. See, e.g., Strauss v. Belle Realty Co., 482 N.E.2d 34 (N.Y.
1985); Lauer v. City of New York, 733 N.E.2d 184 (N.Y. 2000); Johnson v. Jamaica Hospital,
467 N.E.2d 502 (N.Y. 1984).
13 See W. Jonathan Cardi & Michael D. Green, Duty Wars, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 671, 701
(2008) (“[I]t is also notable that Continental tort cases are largely devoid of any analysis of
duty in imposing liability for negligence. In fact, the presumption of an obligation of care is
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Similarly, the demise of a consumer expectations standard in
strict products liability is largely the result of discomfort about how the
standard provides virtually no constraints on the jury when it comes to
how safe a product should be made.14 Yet, the Europeans have, for 30
years, employed a consumer expectations test without any notable
difficulty.15 But in Europe, it is judges who are applying the test.
So, this is the background against which we have formed the
views expressed in this paper about Cardozo and the jury. We are
happy to report that in all of the books about Cardozo, we found only
one in which there was any coverage of this topic—other books about
Cardozo did not even have an entry for the jury in their index.16 We
have read the work of those who knew him and participated in the
multitude of tributes to him and found nothing in them about Cardozo
and the civil jury.17
To us, this is little short of astonishing. The civil jury has long
been a controversial institution, having come under withering criticism
by Mark Twain in the 19th Century.18 John Guinther, who examined
so strong that duty is not even an element of a claim for accidental injury.”); see also
EUROPEAN GROUP ON TORT LAW, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN TORT LAW, IN RESEARCH UNIT FOR
EUROPEAN TORT LAW, EUROPEAN CENTRE OF TORT AND INSURANCE LAW, UNIFICATION OF
TORT LAW: FAULT 369, 372 (Pierre Widmer ed., 2005); see also William L. Prosser, Palsgraf
Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1, 12 (1953) (stating that “the concept [of duty] is unknown to the
continental law”).
14 See Bruce Feldthusen et al., Product Liability in North America, in PRODUCT LIABILITY:
FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS OF PRODUCT LIABILITY IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Helmut
Koziol et al., eds., forthcoming 2017) (“Courts and commentators became concerned about the
indeterminacy of the consumer expectations test for these kinds of cases and the concomitant
unconstrained discretion it afforded juries.”); Mary J. Davis, Design Defect Liability: In
Search of a Standard of Responsibility, 39 WAYNE L. REV 1217, 1236-37 (1993) (explaining
dissatisfaction with the consumer expectations test for design defect claims).
15 See Willem H. Van Boom et al., Product Liability in Europe, in PRODUCT LIABILITY:
FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 253 (Helmut Koziol et al., eds. De
Gruyter 2017).
16 See supra note 2. Pollard mentions the jury only in the context of explaining Wagner
v. International Railway Co., 133 N.E. 437 (N.Y. 1921), in which Judge Cardozo held that
rescuers were foreseeable as a matter of law and therefore the case had to be submitted to the
jury, the issue of the right to jury trial in connection with injunctions to quell public nuisances,
and with regard to arbitration agreements. None of these authors, save for Professor Kaufman,
have written a single word about Cardozo’s views on the jury and its appropriate role in
deciding civil cases.
17
There is such an enormous amount written about Cardozo both during his lifetime and in
memoriam. We have not read it all, but we have read all of the material that seemed most
likely to contain a discussion of Cardozo and the jury.
18 “The jury system puts a ban upon intelligence and honesty, and a premium upon ignorance,
stupidity and perjury. It is a shame that we must continue to use a worthless system
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the jury in America more recently reflected: “[F]or each advocate of
the jury throughout its long history in America, there seems to
have been a matching opponent.”19 During Cardozo’s era, there was
considerable academic attention to the matter. Leon Green, a
contemporary of Cardozo’s, published a book in 1930 entitled Judge
and Jury.20
The one text21 containing a discussion of Cardozo and his
relationship to the jury did not dissuade us from this topic. Because we
don’t agree with that author’s assessment, we are left a little sliver of
room to say something in this article about Cardozo that has not been
said previously.
To lay out our thesis, we find that Cardozo demonstrated little
respect for the jury in the opinions that he wrote,22 and he felt little
reluctance to infringe on its factfinding role in a tort case when it suited
his purposes. He would not only find the historical facts at issue based
on his reading of the appellate record, even when the jury could
reasonably have found them otherwise, but also make the normative
judgment about whether the defendant (or plaintiff) acted reasonably
and whether the harm that occurred was within the defendant’s scope
of liability, known more popularly as proximate cause, two of the
central factual aspects in a negligence case.23

because it was good a thousand years ago.” MARK TWAIN, ROUGHING IT 247 (Am. Pub. &
F.G. Gilman & Co. 1872).
19 See JOHN GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA xiii (Harper & Row 1988); see also Douglas
G. Smith, Structural and Functional Aspects of the Jury: Comparative Analysis and Proposals
for Reform, 48 ALA. L. REV. 441, 444 (1997) (“[T]he civil jury has come under attack as an
archaic institution that has outlived its usefulness. . . .”); Michael D. Green, The Impact of the
Civil Jury on American Tort Law, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 337, 340 n.18 (2011).
20 GREEN, supra note*.
21 The only other discussion of anything approaching this issue, and it is quite peripheral, is
an article on the difference between law and fact in workers’ compensation and its application
to whether an injury “arose out of employment.” The author used the difference between
Cardozo and Andrews in Palsgraf to explain how authority between judge and jury is
allocated. See Kenneth Vinson, Disentangling Law and Fact: Echoes of Proximate Cause in
the Workers’ Compensation Coverage Formula, 47 ALA. L. REV. 723, 754 (1996) (“The real
battle in Palsgraf . . . was whether judge or jury should determine if the scope of railroad
liability should be extended to cover cases such as Palsgraf’s.”).
22 The qualification “in the opinions he wrote” is an important one. Cardozo penned internal
court memoranda recommending to his fellow judges that an appeal be affirmed without
opinion. Those memoranda, as we discuss infra text accompanying notes 152-59 reveal a
different picture from that which we describe in Cardozo’s published opinions.
23 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 cmt. q
(Am. Law Inst. 2012).

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2018

5

Touro Law Review, Vol. 34, No. 1 [2018], Art. 13

188

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 34

By contrast, Andrew Kaufman concludes that “Cardozo was
assiduous in protecting the role of the jury,”24 although he adds that
Cardozo “did not hesitate to take an issue away from the jury when his
reading of a record convinced him that the factual issue should be
decided only one way.”25
We don’t find Cardozo being assiduous with regard to the
jury’s role—rather Cardozo displayed little regard for the jury’s role
in tort cases, at least those in which he took sufficient interest to write
an opinion.
Instead, Cardozo acted as a super-juror, reading the record and
making his own independent judgments. When those judgments
concurred with the jury’s conclusion, he would affirm its decision. But
when he disagreed, he felt free to overturn the decision through a
variety of devices. He was perfectly willing to find facts consistent
with his view of the case, regardless of whether the jury might have
come to a different – yet reasonable – conclusion about them.
Ironically, we are buoyed in this conclusion by a statement that Andy
24

KAUFMAN, supra note 2, at 255. No support is cited for this statement, but a page earlier
Kaufman writes that Cardozo frequently supported affirmance of an appeal based on there
being sufficient evidence to support the jury’s determination. Id. at 253. In communications
with him, he stated that the memoranda cited on that matter were the basis for his assessment
of Cardozo’s approach to the jury.
25 Id. at 255-56. Kaufman’s qualification on his assiduous protector assessment might be
interpreted in at least two ways. One is that Cardozo removed a matter from the jury when no
reasonable jury could find otherwise. That is the well-accepted standard for when a factual
matter becomes a legal one for the court to decide. The second interpretation is that when
Cardozo’s reading of the record persuaded him about the proper outcome of a disputed matter,
he substituted his judgment for that of the jury. The second interpretation is consistent with
our thesis but is incompatible with Kaufman’s assiduous-protector tenet. We should add that
Kaufman, a couple of pages later, wrote more on Cardozo and the jury:
Cardozo was confident in this ability to read case records and decide when
a factual issue was sufficiently clear that it should be decided by the court
and not by a jury. He recognized the potential danger of substituting his
judgment for that of the jury. “If courts are to resist the present tendency
to substitute administrative agencies for the common law tribunals, they
must be ready to accredit to the triers of the acts a reasonable equipment
of common sense and conscience.” But he did overturn jury verdicts in a
moderate number of cases. He saw that as his job.
Id. at 257. The quoted language is from an internal court memorandum that Cardozo wrote.
Id. at 645 n.36. Once again, it is part of a judge’s job to determine whether the party with the
burden of proof has met her burden of production and whether the evidence in a case permits
a reasonable determination by the jury. It is not the court’s role to find or make inferences
about the facts that are different from the ones made by the jury and it is not the court’s job in
substitute its judgment for the jury’s on mixed questions, such as negligence, that are assigned
to the jury. As we lay out in the remainder of this article, we think that is precisely what Judge
Cardozo did in a substantial number of tort opinions he penned.
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Kaufman made while one of us was in Cambridge looking at notes he
had taken while conducting research at the archives of the New York
Court of Appeals. Andy observed that with 23 years of practice, the
largest portion doing appellate work, and his considerable selfconfidence, Cardozo was comfortable that he could read an appellate
record and determine for himself what had occurred.26 Cardozo was
also comfortable with substituting his judgement for the jury’s on
mixed questions of fact and law such as negligence or scope of
liability.27
This article proceeds first to examine several of Cardozo’s torts
opinions, some famous, some not, over the span of his career as a judge
and Justice. All of the cases analyzed are cases that implicate the jury’s
role in making factual determinations, and on appeal at least one issue
involved the question of whether there was sufficient evidence (or
allegations in the complaint) for the jury’s determination. This
examination reveals what we believe is Cardozo’s cavalier approach
to the jury’s role. In the process, Cardozo largely ignored the
procedural posture of the case and the implications for how an
appellate court should approach its role in the appeal.28 After
canvassing those cases, the article turns to how other judges on the
Court of Appeals treated these same matters in opinions they authored
during the period that Cardozo served on the Court of Appeals. Finally,
we assess internal Court of Appeals memoranda prepared by Cardozo
for his fellow judges that recommended affirming cases without an
opinion or denying a discretionary appeal.29
26 Conversation between Andrew L. Kaufman and Michael D. Green, Cambridge, Mass.
(July 13, 2017). See also KAUFMAN, supra note 2, at 254 (“While Cardozo had a strong respect
for the work of the judge and jury of the trial court, he brought from his own legal practice a
confidence in his own ability to grasp particular factual settings and he applied that skill to the
interpretation of . . . case records.”).
27 Kaufman acknowledges this aspect of Cardozo’s judging as well, describing his
“occasional unwillingness to leave a matter to the jury . . . as part of the business of judging to
keep a jury from being swayed by sympathy when the record indicated that there was no factual
issue that ought to be submitted to it.” See KAUFMAN, supra note 2, at 257. Our contention, of
course, goes beyond this: Cardozo intervened even when the record well supported the jury’s
determination.
28 As well, this would include determinations of mixed questions of law and fact that are
assigned to the jury, such as negligence. When no reasonable jury could find in a particular
way on such a question, the matter becomes one of law for the court. See, e.g., Burns v.
Wilkinson, 126 N.E. 513 (N.Y. 1920) (an excellent example of one of Cardozo’s judicial
brethren acknowledging the standard of review).
29 We address these memoranda because they constitute the evidence supporting Andy
Kaufman’s assessment that Cardozo was “assiduous in protecting the role of the jury.” See
Kaufman, supra note 2, at 253 n.26.
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II. ASSESSING JUDGE CARDOZO’S OPINIONS
Preliminarily, it is important to appreciate that at the time
Cardozo was a member of the Court of Appeals, sufficiency review
was similar to what it is today. Facts were for the jury to determine,30
and if the procedural posture of the case involved an appeal based on
the insufficiency of the evidence, the court was obliged to take all the
facts and inferences therefrom as favorable to the verdict winner.31 The
situation was similar for motions to dismiss the complaint and for
summary judgment. Although various verbal formulas were batted
about for what evidence (or allegations) would be sufficient, including
“only a scintilla of evidence,” “no evidence,” “no substantial
evidence,” and “no credible evidence,”32 the inquiry was similar to
sufficiency analysis as we know it today.
There is one quirk of the Court of Appeals’ appellate
jurisdiction as a result of constitutional provisions addressing the same
that requires mention. Until 1926, the court was barred from reviewing
the sufficiency of the evidence if the Appellate Division had ruled
unanimously on the matter.33 After the 1925 revisions to the New York
Constitution, the Court of Appeals’ review of sufficiency matters was
expanded to include cases in which the Appellate Division had
unanimously reversed the trial court’s determination of sufficiency.34
We begin with an obscure torts opinion of Cardozo’s, Perry v.
Rochester Lime Co.,35 which was published only two years after Judge
Cardozo joined the Court of Appeals. Judge Cardozo’s opinion starts
with a paragraph of facts about the case.36 Defendant stored dynamite

30 Although

the Appellate Division might review then to determine if a motion for a new trial
was properly granted or denied. HENRY COHEN, THE POWERS OF THE NEW YORK COURT OF
APPEALS § 124 (Baker Voorhis & Co. 1934).
31 See id. at 344 (“The Court of Appeals assumes that those facts were found which support
the conclusion, in the absence of evidence to the contrary.”). Or, on a motion for summary
judgment, in favor of the party against whom summary judgment was sought. See also id. at
346 n.50 (“The question of law whether there is any evidence to sustain the verdict must be
answered by inquiry, not into what the jury did find, but what it might have found under the
charge. The language is familiar that ‘the jury might have believed this bit of testimony and
rejected that, and the conclusion is that, a question of fact existing, the questions of law
asserted to exist are not shown to exist.”).
32 Id. at 312-13 n.53.
33 See id. at § 103, p. 296.
34 Id. at § 104, p. 298.
35 113 N.E. 529 (N.Y. 1916).
36 Id.
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on the banks of the Erie Canal.37 It did so in an unlocked box in a public
place and in violation of an ordinance.38 Two boys found the dynamite,
stole a container containing considerable firepower, and the next day,
while moving the explosives, accidentally set them off, killing
themselves and a boy of eight who was tagging along with the two
older boys.39 This suit was only about the eight-year old’s death.40
After acknowledging that defendant was negligent in violating
the ordinance, the issue of proximate cause arose.41 Judge Cardozo in
the meat of his opinion then explained why the harm was not
reasonably foreseeable, emphasizing the wrongdoing of the boys who
had stolen the explosives and concluded: The decedent’s “death was
not the proximate result of the open chest in the highway,”42 failing to
acknowledge (surely Cardozo understood) that the law does not
demand that a single proximate cause be identified and that there can
be multiple such causes.43
Our main point is that nowhere does Judge Cardozo tell us the
procedural posture of the case. What happened below is critical to the
appropriate scope of the appellate court’s review, but the opinion is
entirely silent about the matter.44 It is as if Judge Cardozo is deciding
this case as both trier of fact and law in the first instance. That, of
course, was not the case. The trial judge had non-suited the plaintiff,
and the Appellate Division affirmed unanimously without an
opinion,45 so the proper issue was whether there was sufficient
evidence for a reasonable jury to find defendant’s negligence to be a
proximate cause of the child’s death.
Reasonable judges might disagree on that matter, but Judge
Cardozo avoided such consideration by ignoring the procedural
posture and the role of the jury and stating the facts as immutable
without recognizing the range of facts that a jury might have found. By
37

Id.
Id.
39 Id.
40 Perry, 113 N.E. at 529.
41 Id. at 530.
42 Id. It is the case that Cardozo used the phrase “proximate result” rather than “proximate
cause” but the former phrase has no legal meaning and, in context, he could only have meant
proximate cause.
43 Sweet v. Perkins, 90 N.E. 50, 51 (N.Y. 1909) (“There may be more than one proximate
cause of an accident, if each of the causes asserted can be seen to have been an efficient one,
without which the injury resulting would not have been sustained.”).
44 Perry, 113 N.E. 529 (N.Y. 1916).
45 Perry v. Rochester Lime Co., 147 N.Y.S. 1136 (App. Div. 1914).
38
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doing so, he managed also to dodge the prohibition on the Court of
Appeals reviewing sufficiency matters when the Appellate Division
ruled unanimously on the question.46
Perry is also useful as a prelude to Palsgraf,47 as it demonstrates
that the concept of proximate cause was alive and well in New York in
the early twentieth century. Indeed, the Court of Appeals had been
using this concept to limit liability as far back as the mid-nineteenth
century.48
Let us fast forward a dozen years to Palsgraf, which according
to Dean Prosser, is “perhaps the most celebrated of all torts cases.”49
Let us begin with the facts, well not all of the facts, but the
distance of Ms. Palsgraf to the pushing and pulling of the two
passengers. Numerous commentators have addressed the matter of
how far Ms. Palsgraf and the falling scales were from the train and the
fireworks that exploded.50 Judge Posner complains that Cardozo’s
facts were “slanted” and that he “[made up facts.]”51 Professor
Kaufman concludes that “Cardozo’s characterization of Ms. Palsgraf’s
location did have a basis in the record.”52 Yet, other testimony in the
case would have supported a conclusion that she was much closer to
the incident than Cardozo implies.53
The actual distance is not important. What is important is that
Cardozo stated the facts in the same fashion as he did in Perry, as if he

46 See supra text accompanying notes 33-34. To be fair, as John Goldberg urged us,
proximate cause is an issue that courts have long deferred to juries less than they do for the
other judgmental, yet denominated-factual, matter of negligence.
47 Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
48 Ryan v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 35 N.Y. 210-11 (1866).
49 William L. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1, 1 (1953). To stay focused on
our thesis and exercising heroic self-restraint—we will desist from criticizing the substance of
the opinion, already admirably accomplished by the late Gary Schwartz. See Gary T. Schwartz,
Cardozo as Tort Lawmaker, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 305 (1999).
50 See, e.g., William H. Manz, Palsgraf: Cardozo’s Urban Legend?, 107 DICK. L. REV. 785,
788 (2003) (“Cardozo’s impossible version of event has proved remarkably resistant to
criticism or correction.”); cf. VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ’S
TORTS: CASES & MATERIALS 327 (Foundation Press 12th ed. 2010) (identifying discrepancies
between the record and Cardozo’s recitation of the facts).
51 POSNER, supra note 2 at 38. Another commentator who delved deeply into the record and
other sources, concludes that “it is difficult not to conclude that the statement of facts was
crafted to support the result.” Manz, supra note 50, at 816–17.
52 KAUFMAN, supra note 2, at 298.
53 Manz, supra note 50.
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were the factfinder in the case, rather than acknowledging that, on the
mixed evidence, the jury’s job was to determine the distance.54
Moreover, given the jury verdict for the plaintiff, Judge
Cardozo’s role was to defer to what the jury might have found, not to
decide the facts de novo on appeal.55 There can be no doubt that
Cardozo knew his role. Cardozo himself wrote “all facts warranted by
the evidence will be deemed to have been found in favor of the
successful party” in a treatise he authored on New York procedure
while discussing the role of the appellate court in appeals of jury
verdict.56
This phenomenon of stating the facts without a hint of
deference to what the jury might have found based on the record in the
case repeatedly occurs in Cardozo opinions.57 Another example of this
appellate factfinding by Cardozo occurred in Adams v. Bullock.58 That
case involved a young boy who was electrocuted and burned when the
wire he was swinging came in contact with the defendant-trolley’s
electrified wires. To read Judge Cardozo’s opinion, one would think
that there was nothing, save extraordinary measures, available to avoid
the accident. A student author, who read the trial transcript in the case,
states that the court’s outcome, reversing the judgment for the plaintiff,
was strengthened by telling a story that was “not clearly supported by
the underlying record”59 with regard to available precautions. To
borrow the Cardozian style, Economy of opinions this does serve; but
respecting the role of the jury it does not.
The effect of Palsgraf’s adopting foreseeability as the test to
determine whether a duty is owed to the plaintiff—the risk reasonably
perceived defines the duty to be obeyed—rendered duty a matter that
54 Andrew L. Kaufman, Benjamin Cardozo as Paradigmatic Tort Lawmaker, 49 DEPAUL L.
REV. 281, 291-92 (1999).
55 Thus, we disagree with Professor Kaufman who concluded that the blame is on the
plaintiff’s lawyer for not nailing down the distance from the train to the weighing scale.
KAUFMAN, supra note 2, at 297. The plaintiff’s lawyer convinced the jury it was close enough
to impose liability. What the plaintiff’s lawyer didn’t do was convince Judge Cardozo, a
burden that, if the role of the jury were respected, would not exist.
56 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF
NEW YORK 88 at § 59 (2d ed. 1909).
57 As Kaufman puts it, after referring to a number of Cardozo’s opinions, he “came away
from reading the record with such a confident vision of the facts that he concluded that there
was nothing to submit to a jury.” KAUFMAN, supra note 2, at 298-99.
58 125 N.E. 93 (N.Y. 1919).
59 Elizabeth Smallwood, A First-Year Tort Law Institution: Adams v. Bullock 30 (2004)
(unpublished student paper), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/sugarman/adamsfinal1.doc.
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relies heavily on the facts of each case. Some commentators claim that
Palsgraf is, in the end, not that important to tort law.60 Judge Posner
claims that notwithstanding Palsgraf’s treating unforeseeable
plaintiffs as a matter of duty, “Most states continue to muddle along
with the nebulous ‘proximate cause’ approach. . . .”61
Professor Kaufman expressed the view that Palsgraf was
merely a matter of torts taxonomy: would unforeseeability of plaintiffs
be dealt with as a matter of duty as Cardozo held62 or as a matter of
proximate cause, as argued by Andrews?63
But much rides on where we situate this issue. Duty is a matter
of law for the court; proximate cause64 is for the jury. Duty, as a matter
of law, is a general rule of law applicable broadly to all cases falling
60 See Richard A. Epstein, Two Fallacies in the Law of Joint Torts, 73 GEO. L.J. 1377 (1985)
(“[T]he case does not matter. It is a sport: its freakish facts ensure that it will not be repeated,
and no matter how general its language, the case will have (as has in fact been the case) no
precedential importance.”); WILLIAM L. PROSSER & YOUNG B. SMITH, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON TORTS 361 (4th ed. 1967) (“Although the Palsgraf Case has been cited a good many
hundreds of times on the general proposition that there must be duty before there can be
negligence, it appears actually to be of a good deal more theoretical interest than practical
importance. Case have been few and far between in which parallel facts, of direct causation of
harm to the unforeseeable plaintiff can be found.”). Professor Jonathan Cardi also adverts to
this view: “Because a majority of courts render fact-specific plaintiff-foreseeability rulings,
one might argue that whether duty or proximate cause is the proper home for plaintiffforeseeability is no longer of particular relevance to tort law.” W. Jonathan Cardi, The Hidden
Legacy of Palsgraf: Modern Duty Law in Microcosm, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1873, 1897 (2011).
Professor Thomas Cowan, in an early commentary on Palsgraf, identified and criticized its
effect of specifying duty, a rule of law, at such a factually detailed level that it is limited to a
ticket for a single ride on the duty railroad. Thomas F. Cowan, The Riddle of the Palsgraf Case,
23 MINN. L. REV. 46, 58 (1938-39).
61 POSNER, supra note 2, at 41. Recent scholarship casts doubt on Judge Posner’s assessment.
See infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
62 It is worth noting that Cardozo’s turn to duty raised an issue that the defendant had never
argued and which was never presented to the court. See Points for Appellant, Palsgraf v.
Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339 (1928); Plaintiff-Respondent’s Brief, Palsgraf v. Long
Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339 (1928) (both on file with authors). John Goldberg expressed to us
the view that, in the end, Cardozo did act to affirm the jury by not overturning the jury’s
finding of negligence, a matter on which a number of commentators have questioned. We are
not in agreement, accepting the jury verdict was merely a means to enable Cardozo to write
an opinion on an issue that had been the subject of extensive debate in the drafting of the first
Restatement of Torts. See KAUFMAN, supra note 2, at 287-95. We believe that if, in order to
write an opinion on an issue that was important for the day and might have lasting
significance, overturning a jury’s finding was the way to do it, Cardozo would have had no
reluctance to do so.
63 KAUFMAN, supra note 2, at 301 & 302-03.
64 Although a mixed question of law and fact, proximate cause is categorized as a factual
matter for the jury.
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within its scope,65 while proximate cause is about the specific facts of
the case and whether defendant’s liability, given negligence, harm, and
circumstances surrounding them, extends to plaintiff’s harm.66
However, foreseeability is a matter that depends on the specific
facts of the case: if Ms. Palsgraf had been standing next to the guards
when they were pushing the passenger on the train, she would have
been a foreseeable plaintiff. A few feet away, maybe not so clearly,
but a judgment that, in the first instance is for the jury. So Palsgraf
puts the judge in the role of deciding foreseeability in the specific
context of that case, requiring attention to the facts of the case in doing
so, even when the relevant facts are in dispute.67 As Professors
Goldberg and Zipursky have observed, “When courts find themselves
talking about “duty” at a very high level of specificity, they may well
be talking not about duty at all, but about breach.”68 Yes, or about
proximate cause.
Judge Cardozo does, it is true, recognize the role of the jury in
Palsgraf, acknowledging that when foreseeability is subject to
conflicting inferences, the question is for the jury. Professor Jonathan
Cardi recently did an exhaustive 51-state survey of the impact of
Palsgraf on modern tort law.69 He found that, among states he could
classify, the Palsgraf duty approach overwhelmingly prevailed over
proximate cause by an 8-1 ratio.70 He also found an almost even split
among jurisdictions with regard to accepting Judge Cardozo’s
65 RESTATEMENT, supra note 23, at § 7, cmt. a (“[N]o duty rules are matters of law decided
by the courts. . . .”); Cowan, supra note 60, at 55.
66 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 23, at § 29.
67 Professor Seavey remarked on this shift in authority, apparently approvingly, as it gave
“the court greater control of the case.” Warren Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of
Torts, 52 HARV. L. REV. 372, 383 n.17 (1938-39). See also Cowan, supra note 60, at 54-55.
68 John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipurski, The Restatement (Third) and the Place of
Duty in Negligence Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 657, 717 (2001). Professor Cowan, attempting to
formulate a rule to be derived from Palsgraf, illustrates this specificity well:
[A] railroad does not owe to an intending passenger the duty to refrain
from permitting its guards to push upon a moving train another passenger
carrying a package which, though innocent in appearance, contains
fireworks, and which, if joggled from the boarding passenger’s arm, will
fall to the tracks, explode, shake the platform, knock down the scales, and
thus injure the intending passenger.
Cowan, supra note 60, at 56
69 See Cardi, supra note 60, at 1901-13.
70 See Cardi, supra note 60, at 1890-92 (“On this score, Cardozo has clearly won the day.
When faced with the issue, thirty-three (of fifty-one) courts hold with fair consistency that
whether the plaintiff was a foreseeable victim is a question to be decided in the duty context.
Only four jurisdictions clearly follow Judge Andrews in holding that plaintiff-foreseeability is
properly and solely a matter for proximate cause.”).
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qualification that the jury should decide foreseeability when in dispute
for duty purposes. Half of them adhere to the classical view that duty
is a matter for the court and therefore it displaces the jury in deciding
foreseeability.71
Another case, one in which Judge Cardozo issued one of his
infrequent dissents,72 again reveals his attitude about inconvenient
facts. Although a tort case, the issue was a procedural one: whether in
a wrongful death suit, a claim against an initial tortfeasor who caused
plaintiff’s decedent injury in erecting a picket fence could be joined
with a claim against the physician who treated plaintiff’s decedent.73
The majority ruled that they could not, relying in part on the fact that
under existing joinder rules, inconsistent claims could not be joined.74
Dissenting, Cardozo took the common-sense position that
a negligent tortfeasor is not relieved of liability because
the injury has been aggravated by the malpractice of a
surgeon . . . ; that the two causes of action are therefore
not inconsistent, since proof of the one will not exclude
the other, but both may coexist; that each of the
defendants has thus contributed to a single casualty,
which is the subject of action, i.e., the death of the
child.75
The only difficulty with Judge Cardozo’s view is that his
version of the case does not match the facts alleged in the complaint.
The majority opinion reports that plaintiff’s claim was that the initial
tortfeasor’s negligence “solely caused” the death of plaintiff’s
decedent.76 Meanwhile the claim against the physician alleged that he
“so negligently treated him [the decedent] that, solely by reason of such
negligent treatment, intestate died.”77 While each of the alleged
tortfeasors could be a cause of death (Cardozo’s version) that scenario
was just not what the plaintiff alleged.78 While this shaping of the facts
71

Cardi, supra note 60, at 1901.
See Bernard L. Shientag, The Opinions and Writings of Judge Benjamin N. Cardozo, 30
COL. L. REV. 597, 606 (“Judge Cardozo has written few dissenting opinions.”).
73 Ader v. Blau, 148 N.E. 771 (N.Y. 1925).
74 Id. at 775.
75
Id.
76 Id. at 772.
77 Id.
78 Of course, it may be that the majority had the facts wrong, and Cardozo had them right.
But if that were the case, we would have expected Cardozo to highlight that difference and
cite to the record to reveal the majority’s mistake (or, better yet, convince the majority of the
72
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did not implicate any jury determination, it does reveal a willingness
to ignore an inconvenient set of facts in order to reach what Cardozo
deemed the best result.79
Given his intellect, this difference in the factual premises
between Cardozo and the majority could not have escaped his notice.
That he was also the sole dissenter suggests that other judges on the
court appreciated that Cardozo was writing an opinion applicable to a
different set of facts. Perhaps Cardozo was anxious to make the joinder
point for the much more common situation80 of a plaintiff who alleges
the initial harm caused by the first accident was aggravated by the
malpractice of the physician. There is no inconsistency in those claims
and, under New York’s then-existing joinder rules, could properly be
joined.
Greene v. Sibley81 is another much-commented-on case in
which Judge Cardozo wrote an opinion reflecting his view that the
defendant had not been negligent.82 What Cardozo neglected to
mention was the contrary jury determination, although he did add the
offhand statement: “We find no evidence of negligence.”83 Yet, surely

accuracy of his account of the facts before decision was rendered). Cardozo said nothing about
the discrepancy in the factual accounts in his dissent.
79 On this matter, Cardozo turned out to be right. The provision barring joinder of inconsistent
claims was repealed by the New York Legislature ten years later. See Great N. Tel. Co. v.
Yokohama Specie Bank, 76 N.E.2d 117, 120 (N.Y. 1947).
80 Indeed, one might wonder why plaintiff’s lawyer insisted on making inconsistent claims,
such that plaintiff could logically prevail in only one of them, at least if they were joined in
the same case. The reason why plaintiff’s lawyer structured the claim in this inconsistent
manner may stem from the allocation of the burden of proof on aggravation at the time of
Ader. At that time, when one defendant caused some harm to plaintiff and another defendant
aggravated the harm, the burden of proof to show the magnitude of harm that was caused
before the aggravation and after was on the plaintiff. Not until the middle of the twentieth
century did courts begin to shift the burden of proof to defendants. See RESTATEMENT, supra
note 23, at § 26, cmt. h & Rptrs. Note (Am. Law Inst. 2010). Thus, at the time of Ader, it may
have been strategically advantageous to make inconsistent claims when plaintiff could not
show the magnitude of harm caused by each of the initial tortfeasor and the aggravating
tortfeasor.
81 177 N.E. 416 (N.Y. 1931).
82 We find ourselves in disagreement with Andy Kaufman about Greene as well. Andy’s
view is that Cardozo felt the plaintiff had an obligation to look out for herself: “The customer
should simply have looked where she was going.” KAUFMAN, supra note 2, at 257. Whether
the plaintiff looked out for herself or not bears on her own contributory negligence not the
defendant’s negligence. The jury had resolved both negligence by the defendant and the
plaintiff’s contributory negligence in favor of the plaintiff, as the Appellate Division
explained. Greene v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 248 N.Y.S. 491 (App. Div. 1931). Judge
Cardozo’s opinion said nothing about plaintiff’s negligence.
83 Greene, 177 N.E. at 417.
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within his own recitation of facts was evidence of negligence: the
workman on whose leg plaintiff had tripped neglected to warn the
plaintiff after he suddenly shifted his position to his knee so that his
leg was extended into the aisle behind the plaintiff.84 She had seen him
working to her side before he was a threat, then turned to the counter
to receive change for her purchase and did not see him change
position.85 Interestingly, Cardozo’s rendition of the facts differed in
nuanced but significant ways from the Appellate Division, which had,
3-2, affirmed the judgment entered based on the jury verdict.86
In similar fashion, Cardozo’s opinion in MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co.,87 sets up a factual account of the accident in a much cleaner

84

Id.
Id.
86 The Appellate Division wrote:
The jury was warranted in finding that plaintiff, having made a
purchase at a counter in defendant’s store, stood there facing the counter
waiting for her package and change. Hearing a voice just to her right, she
turned her head, and saw two of defendant’s employees talking together
about a cash register located on the counter in front of them and just to the
right of plaintiff.
The cash register was temporarily out of repair, and the employee
standing next to plaintiff had just come there to find out what the trouble
was. Plaintiff’s look disclosed this man standing upright immediately next
to her, in front of the counter where the cash register stood. At that moment
the clerk returned with the package and change. Plaintiff turned to her left
to take them. Then, within a second or so, having in mind the position of
the man as she had just noticed it, she turned to her right— intending to
make ‘a sweep around him standing there’—and stepped out with her left
foot. During the second or so, which those acts of plaintiff occupied, the
man changed his position by dropping down on one knee— his left knee—
in order to look across the surface of the counter and under the cash
register. In that position, his left leg stretched out along the floor behind
him ‘the length of his knee to his foot or heel,’ estimated by plaintiff as
being two feet. As plaintiff swung and stepped—intending to sweep
around him—the outstretched leg caught her foot and she was thrown.
Greene v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 248 N.Y.S. 491, 491 (App. Div. 1931), rev’d, 177 N.E.
416 (N.Y. 1931).
By contrast, in his opinion, Cardozo does not mention the one-second gap between the
time plaintiff observed the workman posing no threat and when she turned to leave and tripped
over his newly outstretched leg. Cardozo also questioned the plaintiff’s credibility, adding the
editorial comment “so she says,” to his relating her testimony that she thought, upon turning,
that he was in the same position as he had been a second before. And, conspicuously absent
from Cardozo’s statement of the facts, as was so often the case, was the Appellate Division’s
introduction to the facts: “The jury was warranted in finding . . . .” Id. at 492.
87 217 N.Y. 382 (1916).
85
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version than that of the Appellate Division.88 Jim Henderson opines
that the reason was to tee up an opinion that would overturn a privity
rule whose time for banishment had come. Although this slanting of
the facts had no impact on the jury’s findings, it does reveal a judge
willing to state the facts in a fashion to further other purposes.
Before concluding this discussion, we have one more example,
the colloquiallyknown“Flopper”case.89 TheFlopper was an amusement
ride on which a young man, on a date with the woman who became his
wife, fell and suffered a fractured kneecap.90 And, no doubt,
considerable bruising of his pride. (Alas, lost pride is not a legally
compensable injury—but a fracture is). The ride consisted of an
inclined, smartly-moving belt that made remaining on one’s feet
difficult.91
Judge Cardozo adopted a robust assumption of risk doctrine to
dismiss the plaintiff’s claim, but the dignity-damaged plaintiff had one
last hope to preserve the jury verdict he had received below: he had
testified that right after alighting on the machine and just before he fell,
the Flopper executed a sudden and unexpected jerk.92 Such a
malfunction by the machine might be the basis for a determination of
negligence and a risk of which the plaintiff was not aware.93
Judge Cardozo was having none of it. Rejecting the plaintiff’s
factual claim that the belt performed improperly when it suddenly
jerked, Cardozo wrote:
One who steps upon a moving belt and finds his heels
above his head is in no position to discriminate
with nicety between the successive stages of the shock,
between the jerk which is a cause and the jerk,
v. Buick Motor Co., 145 N.Y.S. 462 (App. Div. 1914), aff’d, 111 N.E. 1050
(1916). MacPherson, it is true, did not overturn a jury verdict that Professor Henderson claims
is at least questionable. However, at the time of MacPherson, the Court of Appeals was
constitutionally barred from reviewing factual matters that had been affirmed unanimously by
the Appellate Division, which was what the Appellate Division had done. See supra notes 3334 & accompanying text.
89 Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 166 N.E. 173 (N.Y. 1929).
90 Id. at 173-75.
91 Id. at 173.
92
Id. at 174.
93 Cardozo also claimed that even if the Flopper did execute a spasm, it would make no
difference. Id. at 174 (“But the jerk, if it were established, would add little to the case. Whether
the movement of the belt was uniform or irregular, the risk at greatest was a fall.”). That
assessment seems incorrect. Risk reflects the potential magnitude of harm discounted by the
probability of its occurring. If the Flopper jerked, the probability of falling and injuring oneself
would be increased, a risk of which the plaintiff would not have known and therefor assumed.
88 MacPherson
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accompanying the fall, as an instantaneous effect.
There is evidence for the defendant that power was
transmitted smoothly, and could not be transmitted
otherwise. If the movement was spasmodic, it was an
unexplained and, it seems, an inexplicable departure
from the normal workings of the mechanism. An
aberration so extraordinary, if it is to lay the basis for a
verdict, should rest on something firmer than a mere
descriptive epithet, a summary of the sensations of a
tense and crowded moment.94
This language sounds more like the reasoning of a smart juror who is
working out whether to believe the plaintiff or the amusement park
about whether the Flopper did more than its usual flopping than a judge
whose role is to determine if a jury might reasonably have concluded
otherwise about the existence of a jerk.95
Tellingly in this regard is that there was corroborating evidence
in support of plaintiff’s jerk claim; when plaintiff was thrown to the
belt: “His wife in front and also friends behind him were thrown at the
same time.”96 In addition, two witnesses, the plaintiff’s fiancé and his
sister, testified that the belt suddenly jerked.97
So, the issue becomes whether the plaintiff’s jerk testimony
should be believed when coupled with the evidence supporting it. The
defendant’s evidence that a jerk was not possible was persuasive—the
Flopper was driven by a belt that ran smoothly and could not have
suddenly jerked. But this dispute is quintessentially a jury matter, yet

94 Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 166 N.E. 173, 174 (N.Y. 1929). As with Greene
and other cases discussed above, there is reason to question the accuracy of Judge Cardozo’s
account of the facts: “An examination of the trial transcript and exhibits in Murphy reveals that
the story told in Cardozo’s opinion is inaccurate and misleading.” KENNETH W. SIMONS,
Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co.: While the Timorous Stay Home, the Adventurous
Ride the Flopper, in TORTS STORIES 179, 182 (Robert L. Rabin & Steven D. Sugarman eds.
Foundation Press 2003).
95
Another option would have been granting a new trial based on the weight of the evidence.
However, that was a determination left largely to the trial judge and we have no indication that
there was a motion for a new trial made in the trial court. The Court of Appeals did not have
the authority to review new trial motions. See COHEN, supra note 30, at § 125, p. 346.
96 Murphy, 166 N.E. at 174.
97 SIMONS, supra note 94, at 187.
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one that Cardozo arrogated to the court without a word about the
proper procedural handling of the matter.98
We would expect skeptics familiar with Cardozo’s torts
opinions to be thinking, what about Pokora?99 Pokora, with its
complement, Baltimore & O.R. Co. v. Goodman,100 are staples in torts
casebooks. Both cases involve contributory negligence by drivers
crossing railroad tracks and were decided in the U.S. Supreme Court.101
Goodman was authored by Justice Holmes and Pokora
by
Justice Cardozo.102 Both were pre-Erie when federal courts
unabashedly made tort law.
In Goodman, Justice Holmes employed a precept from The
Common Law103 that addressed the emerging body of tort law. He
posited that while initially judges would defer to juries about
negligence, with sufficient experience, courts would develop rules of
law more specific than the general reasonableness standard and that
would then enable clearer law and more efficient case resolutions.104
Holmes adopted a rule in Goodman that required the driver of
an automobile at an obscured railroad crossing to stop, get out of his
vehicle, approach the tracks, look both ways and then return to the
motor vehicle before proceeding or be deemed contributorily negligent
as a matter of law.105 Of course, this “rule” shifted much authority to
the court on this issue. So long as the historical fact of whether the
driver had exited the vehicle was not in dispute, the Goodman rule
would resolve the case without the need for a jury.
Seven years later, after Cardozo succeeded Justice Holmes on
the Supreme Court, the Court confronted another railroad crossing
accident. Although technically limiting Goodman to its facts,106 the
Court effectively overruled the Goodman rule of contributory
negligence.
98 Ken Simons, who wrote a piercing assessment of the Murphy case agrees: “Cardozo is
quick to conclude that the evidence of a sudden jerk is too weak to support the verdict—too
quick in my view.” SIMONS, supra note 94, at 187-88.
99 Pokora v. Wabash Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 98 (1934).
100 275 U.S. 66 (1927).
101 Pokora, 292 U.S. at 99; Goodman, 275 U.S. at 69.
102 Id.
103
OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 123-24 (1881).
104 See G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 161-63 (1993).
105 Goodman, 275 U.S. at 70.
106 Pokora, 292 U.S. at 102 (citing facts contained in the court of appeals opinion in Goodman,
but which were not contained in the Supreme Court’s opinion); see Goodman, 275 U.S. at
102 n.2.
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Cardozo explained how getting out and reconnoitering at a
railroad crossing could, depending on the facts, be more dangerous
than remaining in one’s vehicle.107 This requires careful attention to
the facts of each railroad crossing accident, thereby restoring the role
of the jury to determine those facts as well as the mixed question of
whether the driver had exercised reasonable care on those facts.108
Pokora returned to the jury the evaluative assessment of
whether a driver had exercised reasonable care in negotiating railroad
tracks, removing that determination from the rule of law crafted by
Holmes. Isn’t Pokora jury affirming and therefore inconsistent with
your theory?, we would expect the skeptic to wonder.109
Well, yes, Justice Cardozo in Pokora is jury-affirming. And
this does appear puzzling given the thesis this article pursues. Or,
perhaps, Pokora represents contrary evidence. Let us tender a
response—one we think reasonable and in which we are buoyed by the
fact that another commentator has expressed a similar view.
Justice Cardozo’s Pokora opinion is not about protecting the
role of the jury, rather that is merely a consequence of Pokora. In this
view, we find ourselves largely in agreement with John Goldberg.110
Nowhere in Pokora do we find a hint that Cardozo believed the jury
was the appropriate decision maker or even that he felt the Pokora
decision gave greater authority to the jury in negligence cases was
worth acknowledging. Thus, we posit that Pokora is a product of
Cardozo’s pragmatism in judging,111 his distaste for formalism, and his
attention to contemporary practices—Cardozo appreciated how outof-step Holmes’s rule was with how drivers negotiated railroad
crossings.112 Indeed, Justice Holmes’ view that those crossing railroad
107

Pokora, 292 U.S. at 102 (quoting Goodman, 275 U.S. at 70).
created what Gary Schwartz has characterized as an ethics of particularism about tort
law—each case is different and careful attention to the facts in the instant case is required.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 23, at § 8 cmt. c.
109 John C. P. Goldberg, The Life of the Law, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1419, 1460 (1999).
110 Id.
111 KAUFMAN, supra note 2, at 218-19.
112 Indeed, Cardozo acknowledged this view in Law and Literature, referring to imposing a
duty of vigilance on a guest in another’s car: “I find it hard to imagine a rule more completely
unrelated to the realities of life. Men situated as the guest in the case I have supposed do not
act in the way this rule expects and required them to act. . . . The law in charging them with
such a duty has shaped its rule in disregard of the common standards of conduct, the everyday
beliefs and practices of the average man whose behavior it assumes to regulate.” S ELECTED
WRITINGS, supra note 3, at 364. We find it notable and significant to our thesis that Cardozo
108 And
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tracks should stop, emerge from the vehicle, perform a 180 degree scan
of the tracks, then return to their vehicle and proceed is so comical that
torts students enjoy a good laugh when the standard is articulated in
class.
As Bernard Shientag put it many years ago: “The predominant
characteristics of his philosophy are pragmatic--a flexibility, rather
than a dogmatic rigidity; a concern with facts and realities and
consequences, rather than with abstractions and formal rules.113
Similarly, Leon Green commented that Cardozo was “far more
interested in the solution of the particular problem than in setting up a
rule.”114
III. THE STRUCTURE OF JUDGE CARDOZO’S OPINIONS
Up to this point, we have analyzed Cardozo only on a micro
level, opening up and looking inside individual cases for evidence.
However, zooming out and comparing Cardozo to the other judges
who served with him on the Court of Appeals is the next logical step.
We reviewed every tort case the Court of Appeals heard on appeal that
implicated the issue of judge-jury allocation during Cardozo’s tenure
on the court.115 We were able to pinpoint which aspects of Cardozo’s
characteristics in his opinion-writing were shared by other judges and
which aspects were peculiar to him.
To define the search parameters, only tort cases that were tried
before a jury or granted summary judgment were included. The
appealed issue had to involve a sufficiency of the evidence question.
We limited our review to appeals decided between 1917 and 1932.116
Per curiam and memorandum decisions were excluded. A total of 16
opinions by Judge Cardozo and 41 opinions from other judges fit these
criteria. We prepared two charts, one for Cardozo’s opinions and the
other for the opinions of the other Judges, which can be found in
Appendices A & B at the end of this article. There were three main
aspects of the opinions that we looked for: (1) procedural history, (2)
said nothing about the role of the jury in this instance with its ability to knock the rough edges
off of the law.
113
Bernard L. Shientag, The Opinions and Writings of Judge Benjamin N. Cardozo, 30
COLUM. L. REV. 597, 601 (1930).
114 Leon Green, Benjamin Nathan Cardozo, 33 ILL. L. REV. 123, 124 (1938).
115 See infra Appendix A.
116 The years Benjamin Cardozo served on the New York Court of Appeals. See KAUFMAN,
supra note 2.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2018

21

Touro Law Review, Vol. 34, No. 1 [2018], Art. 13

204

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 34

language that referred to jury involvement, such as “the jury found,”117
and (3) the overall deference to the jury reflected in the opinion.
First, procedural history included discussion of what happened
in the lower courts, so as to frame the basis for the appeal and the role
of the Court in deciding the matter. Thus, if summary judgment was
granted in the trial court on the ground that plaintiff had no evidence
of causation, or because plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a
matter of law, those histories reveal a potential judge-jury issue on
appeal. How much time the judge spent on it and where in the opinion
the procedural history was located were taken into consideration.
To start with a comparison of numbers, only 50%118 of
Cardozo’s opinions included any mention of the procedural
background, while 87.8%119 of the other judges’ opinions dealt with
procedural history (p = .0066). The majority of opinions had the
procedural history placed toward the beginning or within the first few
paragraphs.120 Probing further into the eight cases in which Cardozo
did include procedural background, there is a sense of grudging
acknowledgement rather than recognition of its critical role in framing
the appeal.121 Several of the cases only had a partial history, while
others buried it later in the opinion or split it up over several
paragraphs.122 On the other hand, almost all of the other judges’
opinions containing procedural history placed it within the first or
second paragraph.123 An early and thorough recital of the procedural
history tells the reader what the issue is and the role of the court in
order to frame properly the substantive decision. Cardozo seemed to
pay little attention to that effort, and instead focused on the substantive

117 Touris

v. Brewster & Co., 139 N.E. 249, 250 (N.Y. 1923).
Cardozo Comparison Chart, infra Appendix A.
119 See Judge Comparison Chart, infra Appendix B.
120 See Horton v. New York C. R. Co., 142 N.E. 345 (N.Y. 1923), see also Cadby v. Hill,
132 N.E. 104 (N.Y. 1921).
121 Compare Stern v. Int’l R.R. Co., 115 N.E. 759, 760 (N.Y. 1917) (Judge Cardozo, at the
outset of the opinion, states “[Plaintiff] has obtained a judgment against three defendants” with
no indication as to whether the trial was a jury trial or bench trial until two paragraphs later)
with Orlando v. Pioneer Barber Towel Supply Co., 146 N.E. 621 (N.Y. 1925) (Judge Pound
starts with a sentence summarizing the case, then goes directly into the procedural background.
Several further mentions to the lower court’s decision are made throughout the opinion.).
122 See Adams v. Bullock, 125 N.E. 93 (N.Y. 1919); see also Coons v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 162
N.E. 578 (N.Y. 1928).
123 See Lopes v. Linch, 115 N.E. 15 (N.Y. 1917); see also Muller v. Hillenbrand, 125 N.E.
808 (N.Y. 1920).
118 See
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decision.124 Overall, Cardozo’s attention to the case’s procedural
background reflects comparative indifference to it and concomitantly
identifying and framing any judge-jury issue.125
Jury-friendly indicators are words often found in opinions that
judges use to recognize the role of the jury in making factual findings
based on making credibility assessments and drawing inferences as
well as the deference given to its judgments on mixed questions that
are denominated as matters of fact. Examples of some of these
common indicators include “[t]he jury could (or might) find,”126
“taking all reasonable inferences in favor of . . . ,” “only if evidence
permits,”127 and “[t]he jury was entitled to believe.”128 Indicators are
evidence that the judge, in writing his opinion, acknowledged the role
of the jury and the legal guidelines within which judgment as a matter
of law is appropriate. Indicators are also a way for the judge to remind
the reader of the appropriate standard of review. Indicators that
highlight the judgment as a matter of law standard might say “from the
testimony offered in behalf of the plaintiff the jury could have found .
. .”129 or “the facts determinative of the question presented to us, as the
jury might have found them . . . .”130 Judge Cardozo often failed to
make use of these indicators; they made an appearance in only
43.8%131 of his opinions, as opposed to the 80.5%132 (p = .016)
appearance rate in other Judges’ opinions. Cardozo’s opinions
acknowledged the jury’s factfinding role significantly less than his
legal counterparts did.
To take our analysis a step further, there was only one case
written by other judges in which the opinion lacked both procedural
history and jury indicators.133 The rest of the cases made mention of
the jury and the role it has in deciding factual matters, whether
it was through indicators or a general deference throughout the entire

124

See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
See Perry v. Rochester Lime Co., 113 N.E. 529 (N.Y. 1916).
126 Tantillo v. Goldstein Bros. Amusement Co., 162 N.E. 82, 83 (N.Y. 1928).
127 Loktich v. Bethlehem Eng’g Corp., 152 N.E. 253, 254 (N.Y. 1926).
128 Raolaslovic v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 156 N.E. 625, 627 (N.Y. 1927).
129
Nowakowski v. N.Y. & N. Shore Traction Co., 114 N.E. 1042 (N.Y. 1917) (Chase, J.).
130 Pyne v. Cazenovia Canning. Co., 115 N.E. 438, 438 (N.Y. 1917) (Collin, J.).
131 See Cardozo Comparison Chart, infra Appendix A.
132 See Judge Comparison Chart, infra Appendix B.
133 See McLoughlin v. N.Y. Edison Co., 169 N.E. 227 (N.Y. 1929) (Kellogg, J.).
125
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opinion. On the other hand, only 69%134 (p = .016) of Cardozo’s
opinions made some form of reference to the jury. These numbers
provide important evidence that Cardozo’s approach to appealed jury
decisions was different from and less jury-oriented than his peers.
Finally, our gestalt sense of our comparative reading of these
opinions is that opinions by other judges made clear from their
language at an early stage of the opinion that the court was deciding an
appeal from a jury decision on a potential question of fact.135 Only a
few times was a second read-through necessary to determine the exact
layout of the case. However, when reading Cardozo opinions, multiple
read-throughs were necessary and many cases read like de novo
reviews.136 Overall, the lack of procedural background and recognition
of the role the jury caused backtracking to lower opinions to gather
procedural and factual information,137 an effort not required when
reading other judges’ opinions.
Taking a brief step outside the realm of solely torts decisions,
Cardozo’s disregard of jury determinations is an interesting contrast to
Mark Graber’s (and others’) assessment about Cardozo’s deference to
administrative agencies.138 One might have thought that Cardozo,
despite his extraordinary people skills, would have given little
deference to anyone, at least in his professional life.
Yet he did protect and defer to administrative agencies, which
he thought necessary and important to conducting the business of
government.139 In a case after Cardozo joined the U.S. Supreme Court
involving confusion over different grades and names of pine lumber,
some lumber producers modified their labels voluntarily to avoid
confusion, while others resisted.140 The FTC investigated and found
unfair competition by the latter dealers and issued a remedial order,
which was reversed by the court of appeals. On review, Justice
Cardozo wrote:

134

See Cardozo Comparison Chart, infra Appendix A.
See generally Mintz v. Int’l R.R. Co., 124 N.E. 893 (N.Y. 1919).
136 See generally Fiocco v. Carver, 137 N.E. 309 (N.Y. 1922).
137 Perry v. Rochester Lime Co., 113 N.E. 529 (N.Y. 1916). Here Cardozo fails to make any
mention of the procedural history of the case.
138 See generally supra note 8.
139 See, e.g., Proceedings of the Bar and Officers of the Supreme Court of the United States
in Memory of Benjamin Nathan Cardozo 54-58 (Nov. 26, 1938) (statement of Dean G.
Acheson).
140 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67 (1934).
135
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The findings of the Commission as to facts, if supported
by testimony, shall be conclusive. . . . The Court of
Appeals, though professing adherence to this mandate,
honored it, we think, with lip service only. In form the
court determined that the finding of unfair competition
had no support whatever. In fact what the court did was
to make its own appraisal of the testimony, picking and
choosing for itself among uncertain and conflicting
inferences.141
The irony and inconsistency of his deference to agency
factfinding contrasted with his treatment of juries is palpable.142 Why
the difference? Might it be that deference to expertise was consistent
with Cardozo’s world view while deference to lay judgments was not?
We don’t know, but this seems one plausible explanation.143
IV. JUDGE CARDOZO’S EXTRA-JUDICIAL WRITINGS
We now assess Cardozo’s own unencumbered words about the
jury. What did Cardozo say about his views on the role of the jury in
resolving non-equity civil cases? The jury was no stranger to Cardozo.
Although the bulk of his practice was in appellate courts, Cardozo tried
a substantial number of jury cases before his appointment to the New
York Supreme Court.144 And a considerable number of appeals
confronted by the Court of Appeals during Cardozo’s tenure began
with a jury verdict. For as thoughtful and probing a mind as Cardozo’s
it is hard to believe he had not confronted and formed opinions about

141

Id. at 73.
We have not found any case in which Judge Cardozo did something similar with regard
to protecting a jury’s determination.
143 Unfortunately, there is no way to further investigate as Cardozo never revealed his views
about the jury. See infra text accompanying notes 149-150.
144 That’s not precisely the way that Andrew Kaufman put it in his biography: after explaining
the cases his three-partner firm had in the trial courts, Kaufman concludes “Cardozo must have
handled some of this trial work. . . .” KAUFMAN, supra note 2, at 62. Kaufman has personally
assured us that Cardozo had significant jury trial experience and that those who claim
otherwise, e.g., Proceedings of the Bar and Officers of the Supreme Court of the United States
in Memory of Benjamin Nathan Cardozo 96 (Nov. 26, 1938) (statement of Chief Justice
Hughes “at the bar, he was spared the stormy conflicts of jury trials and the contests which
evoked passion and animosities”), are wrong. See email communication from Andrew
Kaufman to Michael D. Green (June 22, 2017). Judge Posner also reports that Cardozo was “a
highly successful trial lawyer” but cites no source in support. P OSNER, supra note 2, at 2.
142
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the appropriate role of the jury in contemporary dispute resolution.145
What were they?
In three series of lectures, each series published as a book, and
another collection of speeches and lectures published in a fourth book
entitled, Law and Literature,146 “Cardozo tried,” in the words of
Andrew Kaufman, “to describe and defend what he did as a judge.”147
Cardozo ranged over the jurisprudential debates of the day as
formalism was yielding to the realists. He considered the role of policy
in common lawmaking and how to determine the mores of
contemporary society. Cardozo addressed consideration of other
sources of law, including the legislature and made the case for the
formation of an organization to rationalize the welter of common law
precedent that reflected incoherence and created uncertainty—what
was to become the ALI. He addressed negligence, its objective nature,
the need for line drawing in assessing whether a party was negligent,
the frequency that mixed questions of law and fact need to be
decided,148 and the way that the objective standard for determining
negligence deviates from an individualized assessment of wrongdoing
by the defendant.
Throughout all his cogitations about law and judging, Cardozo
used the word “jury” but twice, once, irrelevantly, during a story to
explain the “important truth” that our system relies on the notion that
judges are learned in the law. The story involved a trial judge who got
distracted at the end of a case during instructions and thus “forgot to
tell the jury anything else [about the applicable law].”149 The second
time he used the word “jury” occurs in the course of discussing the
concept of proximate cause and the absence of any definitive test for
its determination. All we get are signposts that might direct one in this
determination, Cardozo explains. Cardozo expresses approval of
Professor Henry Edgerton’s views on this matter150 but adds, “I do not
145 Leon Green wrote in 1930 of the significance of the jury and its relation with appellate
courts as “the dominant idea of Anglo-American courthouse government. The whole of our
procedure is built about it. . . .” He went on to claim that the strongest supporters of the jury
are judges. See LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 375-76 (1930).
146 SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 3, at 338
147 KAUFMAN, supra note 2, at 222.
148 SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 3, at 175-76.
149 SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 3, at 351-52.
150 Henry W. Edgerton, Legal Cause, 72 U. P A. L. REV. 348 (1924). What Edgerton said
about the jury and Cardozo’s coy demurrer on the issue is notable. Edgerton wrote with regard
to proximate cause “[G]ood sense requires that large latitude be left to the judgment and
intuition of the trier of fact; the limit of this latitude is the point beyond which the judgment
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say that I would follow him in all his conclusions as to the relative
function of judge and jury.151 What does Cardozo add to explain his
difference with Edgerton and perhaps thereby shed some light on
where he stands on the jury? Nothing.
Thus, in all his words about law and judging and the struggle
of a judge to remain true to principles that sometimes were not readily
discernable, the role of the jury, its genius and disadvantages, and the
allocation of decision making between court and jury were not
important enough for Cardozo to address.
V. INTERNAL COURT MEMORANDA
The internal processing of cases in the Court of Appeals when
Judge Cardozo sat on the court began with the filing of the parties’
briefs. Oral argument followed, and after argument, the court held a
conference at which one judge was assigned primary responsibility for
each case. The conference also addressed, for each of those cases, the
necessity of a written opinion or, on the other hand, whether the case
could be affirmed without a written opinion, typically in a brief per
curiam opinion. In the latter case, the judge assigned to the case would
prepare a memorandum for the rest of the court summarizing the facts
and explaining why, based on the law, a written opinion was
unnecessary. These memoranda were for internal court use only and
were entirely confidential until Andy Kaufman was able to convince
Sol Wachtler, then the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals, to make
them available for the biography that Kaufman was writing.152 Today,
those memoranda are made available to researchers who can
demonstrate a legitimate need for access.
Those memoranda provide the support for Andy Kaufman’s
assessment of Judge Cardozo’s approach to the jury.153 At Kaufman’s
urging and with his help, we managed to review relevant memoranda,
first by identifying them from Kaufman’s handwritten notes at the time
he was reviewing the memoranda. We chose every case that, from
Kaufman’s notes, it appeared that Cardozo had written a memorandum
and intuition of the court tell it that a reasonable man would not go.” He proceeded to justify
the inconsistent outcomes that will result from leaving this judgment to the jury as a factual
matter rather than entombing such a decision in a legal ruling. Id. at 372-73 (footnote omitted).
151 SELECTED WRITINGS, supra note 3, at 305.
152 See KAUFMAN, supra note 2, at x-xi.
153 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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about a tort case in which a judge-jury issue might have existed. We
then were able to obtain access to those memoranda at the New York
State Archives.
We found 21 cases that met our criteria: tort cases with a judgejury issue decided by the Court of Appeals between 1914 and 1932
without a written opinion in which Judge Cardozo had been assigned
primary responsibility for the case and therefore had authored a
memorandum to the rest of the court with his recommendation for an
affirmance without opinion. Curiously, we found seven cases decided
between 1914 and 1918 and fifteen decided between 1922 and 1933,
but no cases in the years between 1918 and 1922; we have no
explanation for that gap. Virtually all cases involve an institutional
defendant (railroads were common) appealing a jury verdict and trial
court judgment for the plaintiff that was affirmed by the Appellate
Division, although frequently by a divided court.154 In all cases save
two, Cardozo appears comfortable with the jury verdict or at least does
not express disagreement.155
There are a substantial number of cases that provide ample
support for Andy Kaufman’s assessment of Cardozo’s deference to the
jury during the early years of Cardozo’s judicial career. Typical was
154 Recall that, until the 1925 revisions to the New York Constitution, the Court of Appeals
did not have jurisdiction to review a unanimous Appellate Division decision on a matter
involving sufficiency of the evidence.
155 One exception is Schott v. U.S. Printing Co., in which Judge Cardozo wrote: I
do not feel at all satisfied that the defendant omitted any precaution which
it ought reasonably to have taken. But I think that the responsibility
for any injustice that may have been done must rest upon the jury. The
case was fairly submitted to them. They were told that they must find for
the defendant if the absence happened through failure to adjust the guard.
They were told that no guard was to be expected except one that was
reasonably adapted for the practical operation of the machine. They were
told that if this was the first time that the suggestion of such danger came
to the defendant, the failure to provide against it was not a breach of duty,
more than this could hardly have been asked for.
The other is Sanders v. New York Cent. R. Co., 240 N.Y. 639 (N.Y. 1925) (per curiam) in
which Cardozo wrote about the factual causal connection between plaintiff’s having been hit
by a heavy curtain in a locomotive and his apoplexy suffered the following day:
I have a great deal of doubt whether it [the apoplexy was caused by the
blow]. Again, however, the question is one of fact, and beyond our power
of review.
The “beyond our power” statement by Judge Cardozo likely refers to the constitutional
limitations on the Court reviewing a unanimous Appellate Division determination on
sufficiency of the evidence that was in effect at the time of Sanders. The Appellate Division’s
affirmance of the Supreme Court was unanimous. Sanders v. New York Cent. R. Co., 212
A.D. 849 (N.Y. App. Div. 1925).
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what he wrote in his memorandum addressing Gorman v. Brooklyn
Heights R. Co.,156 a case involving a jury verdict for a pedestrian who
was hit by defendant’s trolley while crossing the street. The issue on
appeal was contributory negligence by the plaintiff. Plaintiff and
defendant’s evidence conflicted, and Cardozo wrote: “Accepting the
plaintiff’s version as we must for the purposes of this appeal . . . ,” and
continued on to say “that the question of the plaintiff’s contributory
negligence was for the jury.” In another case, he wrote: “I think a jury
would be fully warranted in holding that the narrative of the
defendant’s witnesses was suspicious and in refusing to accept it.”157
In general, these memoranda reflect just the sort of deference to jury
fact finding in the face of conflicting evidence and jury judgments
about mixed questions of fact and law that judges typically reflect.
However, in several cases beginning in 1924, Cardozo’s
assessments trend away from jury deference and sound more like
Cardozo qua juror. He wrote about a case158 involving a train accident
in which the facts were similar to Pokora v. Wabash Railway Co.,159
and in which the issue was also plaintiff’s contributory negligence.
Cardozo assessed the defendant’s claim that plaintiff had a clear view
when he was 25 feet from the locomotive, as one witness testified, a
fact strongly supporting contributing negligence: “Anyone who tries to
measure the distance of 25 feet with the eye will appreciate how wide
of the mark his estimate is likely to be,” instead of simply deferring to
the jury’s determination that plaintiff was not contributorily negligent.
In another case, in which defendant raised a cockamamie theory about
how plaintiff fell down an elevator shaft that would have exonerated the
defendant, Cardozo wrote: “I think the circumstantial evidence is
abundant that he fell [contrary to defendant’s theory] at the open shaft
upon the floor described.” A handful of other cases reveal Cardozo
immersing himself in the record and analyzing the case from that
perspective, including being willing to overturn the jury’s finding,
unlike the earlier cases that reflected deference. This shift occurs
chronologically, the stronger evidence for Cardozo’s lack of deference
appearing in the cases beginning in 1924 as mentioned above.

156
157
158
159

108 N.E. 1095 (N.Y. 1915).
Albano v. J. F. Tapley & Co., 138 N.E. 431 (1922).
Shapiro v. New York Cent. R. Co., 147 N.E. 202 (N.Y. 1924).
292 U.S. 98 (1934).
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For the missing years of 1918 to 1922, we took a closer look at
the five tort opinions Cardozo published in that period to see if his
attitude towards providing jury decisions with deference would be
similar to those in his internal memorandum surrounding that gap.
What we found were three cases where Cardozo affirmed the original
jury ruling and two cases where he did not.
What do we make of the evidence provided in these
memoranda? First, it is clear that Cardozo understood the role of the
jury with regard to factual matters. Second, there are indisputable
instances in which he respected that role, contrary to what we describe
in his written opinions. Third, we might venture the theory that in cases
in which Cardozo was not invested—recall these are cases in which he
was recommending affirmance without a written opinion—Cardozo
was willing to give the jury its due. Even then, we find instances in
which Cardozo reverted to his super-juror role and could not resist
parsing the record and making his own judgment, although in nearly
every case that judgment conformed to the jury’s judgment.
Yet we do not find this evidence sufficient to negate the
judgment we make based on his written opinions. Cardozo was willing
to adjust the facts to suit his purposes, regardless of what the jury might
have been justified in finding. He was willing to substitute his
judgment for the jury’s when he felt strongly enough about the matter.
Perhaps this is an overstatement, but we think it best captures the
various strands of evidence we found: When the going gets tough,
Cardozo was willing to take significant liberties with the jury’s role; in
cases in which it was easy going, Cardozo was amenable to giving the
jury.its.due.
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APPENDIX A
CARDOZO COMPARISON CHART

Case

Vote
7-0

Result
Denied
New
Trial

Issue
Is there sufficient conflicting
evidence to award a new trial?

6-0-1

Affirmed
Jury

Is there sufficient evidence
to sustain the jury verdict?

7-0

Affirmed
Jury

Is there sufficient evidence to
sustain the jury verdict and is
there enough evidence to show
contributory negligence as a
matter of law?

7-0

Reversed
Jury

Is there sufficient evidence
to sustain the jury
verdict?

7-0

Affirmed
Jury

Is there enough evidence to
sustain the jury verdict and is
there enough evidence to show
contributory negligence as a
matter of law?

6-0-1

Affirmed
Jury

Is there sufficient evidence
to sustain the jury
verdict?

Perry v. Rochester
Lime Co., 113 N.E.
529 (N.Y. 1916)

Stern v. Int'l R.R. Co.,
115 N.E. 759
(N.Y. 1917)

Pellegrino v. Clarence
L. Smith Co., 123 N.E.
153 (N.Y. 1919)

Adams v. Bullock, 125
N.E. 93 (N.Y. 1919)

Nicholson v. Greeley
Square Hotel Co., 125
N.E. 541 (N.Y. 1919)

Ward v. Clark, 133
N.E. 443 (N.Y. 1921)
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Procedural
History

Indicators

Notes

None

None

No mention of the role of
the jury or the lower court
decision.

"jury had the right
to find"

Mentions the jury and its
role only a few times for a
long opinion, but does give
overall deference to it.

1)Brief mention of
procedural background
2)Second paragraph

1)Covers entire
procedural background

"jury might fairly
find"

Strong jury-friendly
language throughout
opinion.

2)First paragraph

1)Brief mention of
procedural background
None
2)First paragraph

1)Covers entire
procedural background

"as a jury might
find"

2)First paragraph

1) Covers entire
procedural background
None
2) First paragraph
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Does not mention the jury.
Cardozo's decision is a 'no
reasonable jury could find'
but never says so.

Strong jury-friendly
language throughout
opinion.

Strong jury-friendly
language throughout
opinion.
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Case
Fiocco v. Carver,
137 N.E. 309
(N.Y. 1922)

Vote
7-0

Result
Reversed
Jury

Issue
Is there sufficient evidence to
sustain the jury verdict?

Hinz v. Eighth Ave.
R.R. Co., 152 N.E.
475 (N.Y. 1926)

6-0-1

New Trial

Is there sufficient evidence to
sustain the jury verdict and is
there enough evidence to show
contributory negligence as a
matter of law?

Baker v. Lehigh
Valley R.R. Co.,
161 N.E. 445
(N.Y. 1928)

7-0

Affirmed
Jury

Is there sufficient evidence
to sustain the jury verdict?

Palsgraf v. Long
Island R.R. Co.,
162 N.E. 99
(N.Y. 1928)

4-3

Reversed
Jury

Is there sufficient evidence
to sustain the jury verdict?

Coons v. N.Y. Tel. Co.,
162 N.E. 57
(N.Y. 1928)

7-0

Reversed
Jury

Is there sufficient evidence
to sustain the jury verdict?

Murphy v. Steeplechase
Amusement Co.,
166 N.E. 173
(N.Y. 1929)

6-1

Reversed
Jury

Is there sufficient evidence
to sustain the jury verdict?

Woloszynowski v.
N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co.,
172 N.E. 471
(N.Y. 1930)

7-0

Reversed
Jury

Is there sufficient evidence
sustain the to
jury verdict?

Greene v. Sibley,
177 N.E. 416
(N.Y. 1931)

5-2

Reversed
Jury

Is there sufficient evidence
to sustain the jury verdict?
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Procedural History
1) Brief mention of
procedural background

Indicators
None

2) First paragraph

217
Notes

No mention of jury past
procedural history. Cardozo s
decision is a ‘no reasonable
jury could find’ but never says
so.

“the jury might have found”

1) Covers entire procedural
background

“jury might determine”
“jury might say”
“jury should say”

2) second paragraph

“jury must decide”
None

“must be measured by
a jury”

None

1)Partial procedural
background

None

Only mentions jury once
to say that sometimes
inferences are for the jury,
and sometimes they are for
the court

None

None

Reader doesn’t know that it
was a jury case until the final
paragraph. Mentions how
there is “no adequate basis for
finding…” but otherwise no
other homage to the standard or
the procedural history.

None

None

None

None
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Strong jury-friendly
language, talks about
conflicting evidence and the
jury role.

Only mentions jury during
partial recitation of
procedural history.
Otherwise no deference is
shown.

2)Second paragraph

None

Strong jury-friendly
language with mention of
jury throughout.

No mention of jury. Frames
argument around "no reasonable
basis" but fails to embrace the
"jury could find" language. Also
no mention of reasonable
inferences in favor of the party
against whom jnov is sought.

Strong jury-friendly
language with mentions of
jury throughout.
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Vol. 34

APPENDIX B
JUDGES COMPARISON CHART

Case
Larkin v. N.Y.
Tel. Co.,
114 N.E. 1043
(N.Y. 1917)

Nowakowski v.
N.Y. & N. Shore
Traction Co.,
114 N.E. 1042
(N.Y. 1917)

Lopes v. Linch,
115 N.E. 15
(N.Y. 1917)

Judge

Pound

Chase

Hogan

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol34/iss1/13

Cardozo
Vote

Issue

Concur

Is there sufficient
evidence to sustain
the jury verdict?

Concur

Is there sufficient
evidence to show
contributory
negligence as a
matter of law?

Concur

Is there sufficient
evidence to show
contributory
negligence as a
matter of law?
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Procedural
History
1) Covers
entire
procedural
background
2) Second
paragraph

219

Indicators

Notes

"the jury
might have
found"

Attentive to procedural
history, and uses a great deal
of jury-friendly language
throughout entire opinion.
Uses a great deal of juryfriendly language through
entire opinion.

1) Covers
entire
procedural
background
2) Second and
third paragraph

1) Covers
entire
procedural
background

"the jury had a
right to find"

"We must assume from the
record that the jury had a right
to find that the trolley car was
"the jury could
run 'fast' and that the
have found"
motorman did not blow the
whistle or ring the bell. From
the testimony offered in behalf
of the plaintiff the jury could
have found..."
While there are no buzzwords,
speaks about the difference
between questions of law and
fact. Talks about the jury's role
at least four times.
None

2) First
paragraph
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"It is not easy to fix the exact
boundary between the question
of contributory negligence as a
question of law and that of
contributory negligence as a
question of fact."
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Case
Escher v. Buffalo
& Lake Erie
Traction Co., 115
N.E. 445
(N.Y. 1917)
Pyne v.
Cazenovia
Canning. Co., 115
N.E. 438
(N.Y. 1917)
Schmidt v.
Leonhardt Michel
Brewing Co., 116
N.E. 991
(N.Y. 1917)

Ochs v. Woods,
117 N.E. 305
(N.Y. 1917)

Turner v. Crystal
Film Co., 121
N.E. 784
(N.Y. 1919)

Judge

McLaughlin

Collin

Collin

Collin

Andrews

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol34/iss1/13

Cardozo
Vote

Vol. 34

Issue

Concur

Is there sufficient
evidence to
sustain the jury
verdict?

Concur

Is there sufficient
evidence to
sustain the jury
verdict?

Concur

Is there sufficient
evidence to
sustain the jury
verdict?

Concur

Is there sufficient
evidence to
sustain the jury
verdict?

Concur

Is there sufficient
evidence to
sustain the jury
verdict?
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Procedural
History
1) Covers entire
procedural
background
2) First
paragraph
1) Covers entire
procedural
background
2) First
paragraph
1) Covers entire
procedural
background
2) First
paragraph

1) Covers entire
procedural
background
2) First
paragraph

221

Indicators

Notes

"it was for the
jury to say"

Talk's about the jury's role
and lists conflicting evidence
that should be given to a jury
to determine.

"the facts…as
the jury might
have found
them"

Brief mention of jury
throughout opinion.

"the facts…as
the jury might
have found
them"

Walks through conflicting
evidence and uses strong
language to show a lack of
evidence such as "barren,"
"no proof," and
"inconceivable."

"the evidence
enabled the
jury to find"
"jury could
have found"
"jury might
reasonable
have found"

"on the
1) Covers entire
evidence the
procedural
jury might have
background
found"
2) First
paragraph
"jury might
say"
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Strong jury-friendly language
throughout. Mentions the
conflicting evidence that
requires a jury decision.

Frames the facts and
argument around the
evidence as "the jury might
have found." The entire
opinion was very juryfriendly
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Case
Gilhooley v.
Burgard, 122 N.E.
257 (N.Y. 1919)

Elias v. Lehigh
Valley R.R. Co.,
123 N.E. 73
(N.Y. 1919)

Fallon v.
Swackhamer,
123 N.E. 737
(N.Y. 1919)

Mintz v. Int'l R.R.
Co., 124 N.E. 893
(N.Y. 1919)

Muller v.
Hillenbrand,
125 N.E. 808
(N.Y. 1920)

Judge

Cardozo
Vote

Vol. 34

Issue

Concur

Is there sufficient
evidence to
sustain the jury
verdict?

Andrews

Concur

Is there sufficient
evidence to show
contributory
negligence as a
matter of law?

Crane

Dissent
(no
opinion)

Is there sufficient
evidence to
sustain the jury
verdict?

Concur

Is there sufficient
evidence to
sustain the jury
verdict?

Concur

Is there sufficient
evidence to
sustain the jury
verdict?

Hogan

Collin

McLaughlin
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Procedural
History
1) Mentions
procedural history
2) Scattered
throughout opinion

Indicators

Notes

None

Does not mention the
jury until the decision is
rendered in the opinion.
Mostly a recitation of
the facts and a few small
paragraphs of analysis.

"it was for the
jury to say"
None

1) Covers entire
procedural
background
2) First paragraph

1) Covers entire
procedural
background
2) First paragraph

1) Covers entire
procedural
background
2) First paragraph

"may be
considered by a
jury"

"evidence
warrants no such
conclusion"

"jury might have
found"
"the entire
evidence
established"
"the evidence
…justified the
jury in finding"
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Gets to a brief jury
discussion after facts are
laid out. Very
streamlined opinion.
Doesn't mention jury by
name other than
procedural history.
Judge enters a JMOL
and uses language to
show that no reasonable
person could find
otherwise.

Strong jury-friendly
language throughout.

Short opinion, limited
jury discussion. But,
frames analysis around
jury role.

41

Touro Law Review, Vol. 34, No. 1 [2018], Art. 13

224

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 34

Case

Judge

Cardozo
Vote

Burns v.
Wilkinson, 126
N.E. 513
(N.Y. 1920)

Andrews

Concur

Is there sufficient
evidence to sustain
the jury verdict?

Andrews

Concur
in result

Is there sufficient
evidence to sustain
the jury verdict?

Concur

Is there sufficient
evidence to show
contributory
negligence as a
matter of law?

Concur

Is there sufficient
evidence to sustain
the jury verdict?

Campbell v.
Richmond Light
& R.R. Co., 127
N.E. 271
(N.Y. 1920)
Christensen v.
James S. Hannon,
Inc., 129 N.E.
655 (N.Y. 1920)

Ford v. McAdoo,
131 N.E. 874
(N.Y. 1921)

Andrews

Crane
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Procedural
History

Indicators

225

Notes
Speaks directly about the
burden of proof and the jury's
role up front in the opinion.

1) Covers entire
procedural
"clearly for the jury to
background
decide"
2) First
paragraph

"Assuming as we must,
therefore, the truth of the
plaintiff's story, giving him
the benefit of all the
inferences to which a jury
might say he is entitled and
resolving all disputed points
in his favor, we must
determine whether this
conclusion was justified, or
whether there was involved a
question of fact."

"the jury might find"

Uses jury-friendly language
throughout opinion despite
lack of procedural history.

1) Covers entire
procedural
"it is generally for the
background
jury to say"
2) Second
paragraph

Uses jury-friendly language
throughout opinion.

None

1) Brief
mention of
procedural
background
2) Midway
through the
opinion

"there is no evidence
to show"
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No direct references or use of
other jury indicators. Had to
infer that the ruling was a
JMOL.
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Case

Cadby v. Hill,
132 N.E. 104
(N.Y. 1921)

Judge

Hogan

Cardozo
Vote

Vol. 34

Issue

Concur

Is there sufficient
evidence to sustain
the jury verdict?

Grulich v. Paine,
132 N.E. 100
(N.Y. 1921)

Chase

Concur

Is there sufficient
evidence to show
contributory
negligence as a
matter of law?

Riley v. Standard
Oil Co., 132 N.E.
97 (N.Y. 1921)

Andrews

Concur

Is there sufficient
evidence to sustain
the jury verdict?

Concur

Is there sufficient
evidence to sustain
the jury verdict?

Singer v. Erie
Railroad Co., 132
N.E. 912
(N.Y. 1921)

Hiscock
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Procedural
History
1) Covers entire
procedural
background
2) First and
second paragraph
1) Covers entire
procedural
background
2) Midway
through the
opinion
1) Covers entire
procedural
background
2) First paragraph

Indicators
"the jury might
have credited the
evidence"
"the jury might
find"

227

Notes

Mentions multiple times
that the issue before the
court is one for the jury.

"the jury could
have found"
"accepting the
facts as the jury
could have found
them"

"as the jury have
said"

Mentions the jury
multiple times
throughout opinion.

Short opinion, makes
references to the jury
and its role often.
Gives deference to jury
several times.

1) Brief mention
of procedural
background
2) First paragraph
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None

"We do not see how it is
possible to permit a jury
to say that intestate was
vigilant or that he
exercised any care at
all."
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Case

Judge

Cardozo
Vote

Vol. 34

Issue

Wardrop v. Santi
Moving &
Express Co., 135
N.E. 272
(N.Y. 1922)

Andrews

Concur

Is there sufficient
evidence to sustain
the jury verdict?

Touris v.
Brewster & Co.,
139 N.E. 249
(N.Y. 1923)

McLaughlin

Concur

Is there sufficient
evidence to sustain
the jury verdict?

Concur

Is there sufficient
evidence to show
contributory
negligence as a
matter of law?

Horton v. New
York C. R. Co.,
142 N.E. 345
(N.Y. 1923)

Crane
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Procedural
History

Indicators

229

Notes
Strong jury-friendly language
throughout.

None

"the jury
might infer"

"Under these circumstances we
cannot say that he was guilty of
negligence as a matter of law"
Strong jury-friendly language
throughout.

1) Covers entire
procedural
background
2) First
paragraph

"The jury
found"

"To permit the jury to find
defendant negligent, under the
facts here stated, and which are
substantially uncontradicted,
would be to make the owner of
an automobile liable beyond
reason and common sense."
A lot of strong jury-friendly
language throughout entire
opinion.

1) Covers entire
procedural
background
2) Second
paragraph

None
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"I cannot find in the acts of
[plaintiff], as I have given them
above, any evidence that he
violated section 53-a of the
Railroad Law, and I find
nothing in the entire case to
justify the courts in saying so
as a matter of law. Whether he
did was a question for the jury."
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Case

Judge

Cardozo
Vote

Vol. 34

Issue

Orlando v. Pioneer
Barber Towel
Supply Co.,
146 N.E. 621
(N.Y. 1925)

Pound

Concur

Is there sufficient
evidence to rule on
liability as a matter
of law?

Simpson v.
Coastwise
Lumber & Supply
Co., 147 N.E. 77
(N.Y. 1925)

Crane

Concur

Is there a question
of fact for the jury
to decide?

Concur

Is there a question
of fact for the jury
to decide?

Concur

Is there sufficient
evidence to sustain
the jury verdict?

Concur

Is there sufficient
evidence to sustain
the jury verdict?

Hyman v. N.Y.
Cent. R.R. Co.,
147 N.E. 613
(N.Y. 1925)
Nalli v. Peters,
149 N.E. 343
(N.Y. 1925)
Loktich v.
Bethlehem Eng'g
Corp., 152 N.E.
253 (N.Y. 1926)

Crane

Crane

Lehman
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Procedural
History

231

Indicators

Notes

None

Frames the entire analysis
around "whether as a matter of
law the presumption was
overcome." Strong juryfriendly language.

1) Covers entire
procedural
background
2) Directly after
facts

"jury did not
believe."

Speaks about jury throughout
decision, and explains there
was no question of fact for the
jury to rule on.

1) Covers entire
procedural
background
2) Second
paragraph

"matter for
the jury to
pass on"

Constantly mentions jury's role
versus judge's role in
determining whether the issue
was one of fact or law.

1) Covers entire
procedural
background
2) Third
paragraph

"the jury
might find, or
reasonably
infer"

Frames question around the power
of the jury and mentions jury
twice during very short opinion.

None

"only if the
evidence
permits"

Doesn't mention the jury. Frames
argument around the lack of
evidence.

1) Covers entire
procedural
background
2) First
paragraph
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Case
Dalton v.
Hamilton Hotel
Operating Co.,
152 N.E. 268
(N.Y. 1926)

Judge

Hiscock

Cardozo
Vote

Vol. 34

Issue

Concur

Is there sufficient
evidence to sustain
the jury verdict?

Raolaslovic v.
N.Y. Cent. R.R.
Co., 156 N.E. 625
(N.Y. 1927)

Kellogg

Concur

Is there sufficient
evidence to sustain
the jury verdict?

Shuman v. Hall,
158 N.E. 16
(N.Y. 1927)

Crane

Concur

Is there sufficient
evidence to sustain
the jury verdict?

Concur

Is there sufficient
evidence to sustain
the jury verdict?

Tantillo v.
Goldstein Bros.
Amusement Co.,
162 N.E. 82
(N.Y. 1928)

O'Brien
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Procedural
History
1) Covers
entire
procedural
background
2) Midway
through the
opinion

1) Brief
mention of
procedural
background
2) First
paragraph

CARDOZO AND THE CIVIL JURY

Indicators

233

Notes
No mention of jury.

None

"if the
evidence here
was such as to
justify the jury
in believing"
"the jury was
entitled to
believe"

"when we come to the reversal of
the judgment on the facts, the
evidence so clearly sustains this
disposition that we cannot and
ought not to interfere with it."

Constantly refers to the jury
throughout opinion. Great
breakdown of conflicting facts.

"for the jury to
decide"

1) Mentions
procedural
background
2) Midway
through the
opinion

1) Mentions
procedural
background
2) Second
paragraph

None

Strong jury-friendly language in
the last few paragraphs of
opinion.

"the jury
could find"
"the jury
could and did
find"
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Spatters of jury references
throughout opinion.
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Case

Judge

Cardozo
Vote

Vol. 34

Issue

Sandler v. Garrison,
164 N.E. 36
(1928)

Kellogg

Concur

Is there sufficient
evidence to sustain
the jury verdict?

Hendricks v.
N.Y., New Haven
& Hartford R.R.
Co., 167 N.E. 449
(N.Y. 1929)

O'Brien

Dissent
(no
opinion)

Is there sufficient
evidence to sustain
the jury verdict?

McLoughlin v.
N.Y. Edision Co.,
169 N.E. 227
(N.Y. 1929)

Kellogg

Dissent
(no
opinion)

Is there sufficient
evidence to sustain
the jury verdict?

Concur

Is there sufficient
evidence to show
contributory
negligence as a
matter of law?

Concur

Is there sufficient
evidence to sustain
the jury verdict?

Reinzi v. Tilyou,
169 N.E. 101
(N.Y. 1929)

Harriman v. N.Y.,
Chi. & St. Louis
R.R. Co., 171
N.E. 686
(N.Y. 1930)

Pound

Hubbs
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Procedural
History
1) Brief mention
of procedural
background
2) First paragraph

1) Covers entire
procedural
background
2) First paragraph

Indicators

Notes

"No proof
whatsoever"

Doesn't mention the jury,
but spends a lot of time
discussing the severe lack
of evidence.

"from
conflicting
evidence the jury
could find"
"the jury must be
presumed to
have found"

1) Brief mention
of procedural
background
2) Third
paragraph

Talks about the
conflicting evidence and
refers to the jury's role
often.

None

Doesn't mention jury until
judgement is rendered.
Uses a lot of language
such as "could be
inferred" when discussing
the facts.

"the plaintiff
offered evidence
from which the
jury might find"

Spends some time
discussing when the
evidence rises to the level
of being able to render a
JMOL compared to
leaving the issue for the
jury.

None

1) Mentions
procedural history
2) Scattered
throughout
opinion

235

"the jury has
found, upon
sufficient
evidence"

Strong jury language
throughout opinion.

"the jury was
justified in
finding"
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